Rotation-Equivariant Neural Networks for Privacy Protection by Zhang, Hao et al.
Rotation-Equivariant Neural Networks for Privacy
Protection
Hao Zhang
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
1603023-zh@sjtu.edu.cn
Yiting Chen
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
sjtucyt@sjtu.edu.cn
Haotian Ma
Southern University of Science and Technology
11612807@mail.sustc.edu.cn
Xu Cheng
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
xcheng8@sjtu.edu.cn
Qihan Ren
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
renqihan@sjtu.edu.cn
Liyao Xiang
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
xiangliyao08@sjtu.edu.cn
Jie Shi
Huawei International
shi.jie1@huawei.com
Quanshi Zhang
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
zqs1022@sjtu.edu.cn
Abstract
In order to prevent leaking input information from intermediate-layer features,
this paper proposes a method to revise the traditional neural network into the
rotation-equivariant neural network (RENN). Compared to the traditional neural
network, the RENN uses d-ary vectors/tensors as features, in which each element
is a d-ary number. These d-ary features can be rotated (analogous to the rotation
of a d-dimensional vector) with a random angle as the encryption process. Input
information is hidden in this target phase of d-ary features for attribute obfuscation.
Even if attackers have obtained network parameters and intermediate-layer features,
they cannot extract input information without knowing the target phase. Hence,
the input privacy can be effectively protected by the RENN. Besides, the output
accuracy of RENNs only degrades mildly compared to traditional neural networks,
and the computational cost is significantly less than the homomorphic encryption.
1 Introduction
Considering computational constraints, raw data collected for deep learning is often processed in a
distributed system rather than being processed locally. Hence, the privacy leakage happens frequently
and has received much attention recently. Many researches [3, 4, 15, 16, 20, 25, 28] have pointed out
that, attackers can recover significant amount of sensitive input information from intermediate-layer
features of a DNN. As countermeasures, several studies [13, 17, 18, 23, 27] have been proposed, but
have limited applicability mostly due to the exorbitant computational cost.
The task of attribute obfuscation and privacy protection on DNNs mainly needs to satisfy two
requirements. First, even if attackers have access to network parameters and intermediate-layer
features, they cannot reconstruct the input or infer private attributes of inputs. Second, the privacy-
protection method should not increase the computational cost, or affect the task accuracy significantly.
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Therefore, we propose a set of generic rules to revise a traditional neural network into a rotation-
equivariant neural network (RENN) without sacrificing either task accuracy or computational effi-
ciency too much. Unlike traditional neural networks, the RENN uses d-ary vectors/tensors as features,
where each element is a d-ary number. Input information is placed in a random component of the
d-ary feature, where other (d− 1) components are used as (d− 1) fooling counterparts.
The basic idea for privacy protection is to rotate the d-ary intermediate-layer feature with the
same certain angle as the encryption process. In the d-ary feature, each element is rotated with a
specific rotation angle, which is termed the phase. This phase is analogous to the orientation of a
d-dimensional vector. In this way, we consider that input information is hidden inside the target
phase, which can be taken as the private key. Without knowing this target phase, the input information
cannot be recovered from the encrypted d-ary feature.
The architecture of the RENN is shown in Fig. 1, which can be split into an encoder, a processing
module, and a decoder. The encoder extracts the feature of the input, which is a real-valued
vector/tensor, and converts it into a certain component of the d-ary vector/tensor. Then, the encoder
rotates this d-ary feature to make the input information hidden in a target phase as the encryption
process. The rotated d-ary feature is sent to the processing module for further process. The decoder
decrypts the processed feature and obtains the final result.
In order to ensure the successful decryption of the decoder, the processing module has to satisfy the
rotation equivariance property [2]. In other words, given an input, we first rotate the feature extracted
from the input with a certain angle θ, and send this rotated feature to the processing module to obtain
the intermediate-layer feature α. Alternatively, we can first send the feature extracted from the input
to the processing module, and then rotate this processing module’s feature with the same rotation
angle θ to get the rotated feature β. The rotation equivariance property indicates that the first rotated
and then processed feature α equals to the first processed and then rotated feature β. Meanwhile,
this property also ensures that we can directly invert the rotation for encryption to decrypt the output
feature of the processing module.
In this way, we propose a set of rules to revise traditional layerwise operations including ReLU,
batch-normalization, etc. to make them rotation-equivariant. The rotation equivariance property
ensures that the decoder can successfully decrypt input information. The proposed rules can be
broadly used to revise layerwise operations in DNNs with different architectures for various tasks.
Furthermore, in order to improve the ability of privacy protection, the target phase is obfuscated by
adversarial learning, i.e. using a GAN to generate (d− 1) fooling counterparts in d-ary features to
fool the attacker. Experimental results showed that RENNs outperformed other baselines in terms of
privacy protection, yet the accuracy was not significantly affected.
Previous methods usually sacrificed the computational efficiency or decrease the task accuracy
for privacy protection. Siamese fine-tuning [18] reduced the level of sensitive information in the
input, so that attackers could not infer private properties from intermediate-layer features. The
PrivyNet [13] was proposed to explore the trade-off between the privacy protection and the task
accuracy. A lightweight privacy protection mechanism [23] was applied, which consisted of data
nullification and random noise addition. Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic technique,
which can be applied in the privacy protection in deep learning. The BGV encryption scheme [27] was
adopted to encrypt data, and the high-order backpropagation algorithm was performed for training.
Data was distributed among two non-colluding servers in [17], where the model was trained using
secure two-party computation. Complex-valued NN [24] used complex-valued feature for privacy
protection. In comparison, our algorithm can be considered as a generic method to revise traditional
DNNs into privacy-preserving RENNs with broad applicability. Crucially, according to Table 3, the
computational cost of the homomorphic encryption is roughly 809 − 3236 times than that of the
RENN. Besides, the complex-valued NN can be regraded as a special case of the RENN (d = 2),
which is discussed in Sec. 2.3.
Contributions of this study are summarized as follows. (1) We propose a set of generic rules to revise
traditional DNNs into RENNs, which hide sensitive input information in a random phase. Without
knowing the target phase, attackers can hardly infer any input information from features. (2) RENNs
incur far less computational overhead than crypto-based methods.
A previous and specific version of the RENN is the quaternion neural network [26].
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Figure 1: Overview of the RENN. RENN is composed of an encoder, a processing module, and a
decoder. The encoder module (I) is located at the local device. The input feature a is extracted and
converted into a d-ary feature for encryption. The encryption process is to rotate this d-ary feature by
a certain rotation matrix R along a random axis with a random angle θ. This encrypted d-ary feature
is further processed by the processing module (II) which satisfies the rotation equivariance property.
The decoder module (III) uses the same rotation to decrypt features to obtain the final result.
2 Algorithm
2.1 Deep Rotation-Equivariant Features
Rotation: For a traditional DNN, an intermediate-layer feature can be a real-valued vec-
tor/matrix/tensor. For simplicity, this real-valued feature can be vectorized into f ∈ Rn. In this paper,
we extend the real-valued feature into a d-ary feature, where each element is a d-ary number. This
d-ary feature can be denoted by f ∈ Hnd , where Hd represents the domain of d-ary numbers and f is
a vector of d-ary numbers. In real applications, we can still apply traditional convolution operations
to the d-ary feature, i.e. applying convolution operations to the real-valued feature component
corresponding to each component of this d-ary feature independently.
In this way, the rotation of the d-ary feature f can be performed with a rotation matrix R ∈ Rd×d [7],
i.e. R ◦ f , where ◦ denotes the matrix multiplication between R and each d-ary element in f . In this
way, we can consider each d-ary element in the d-ary feature as the d-dimensional vector, and R ◦ f
indicates that we apply the same rotation matrix to each d-dimensional vector. R is a rotation matrix
if and only if it satisfies (1) R is a unit orthogonal matrix; (2) det(R) = 1.
Rotation Equvariance: In this study, we perform layerwise revisions to a DNN to achieve rotation
equvariance property for the d-ary feature during the forward propagation. Given an input, we
first rotate the feature extracted from the input with a certain angle, and send this rotated feature
to a DNN to obtain the intermediate-layer feature α. Meanwhile, we can first send the feature
extracted from the input to the DNN, and then rotate this intermediate-layer feature with the same
rotation angle to get the rotated feature β. The rotation equivariance property indicates that the
first rotated and then processed feature α equals to the first processed and then rotated feature β.
To achieve the above rotation equivariance, we should ensure the layerwise rotation equivariance.
Let Φ(f) = ΦL(ΦL−1(· · ·Φ1(f)) represent cascaded layers of a DNN, where Φl(·) and fl =
Φl(Φl−1(· · ·Φ1(f)) denote the function of the l-th layer and its output, respectively. We revise
traditional layerwise operations to ensure the feature transformation in Φ rotation-equivariant as
follows.
∀ l, Φl(R ◦ fl−1) = R ◦ Φl(fl−1) =⇒ Φ(R ◦ f) = R ◦ Φ(f) (1)
In this way, six most widely used operations including convolution, ReLU, batch-normalization,
avg/max-pooling, dropout, and skip-connection are revised to make them rotation-equivariant.
• Convolution: For the convolutional layer, we remove the bias term to ensure rotation equivariance,
and get Conv(f) = w ⊗ f . Note that this revision can also be applied to the fully-connected layer,
since the fully-connected layer can be considered as a special convolutional layer.
• ReLU: The ReLU operation is revised into ReLU(fv) = ‖fv‖max{‖fv‖,C} · fv, where C denotes a
positive scalar, and fv ∈ Hd is the v-th (1 ≤ v ≤ n) d-ary element in the feature f ∈ Hnd .
• Batch-normalization: The batch-normalization operation is transformed into norm(f (k)v ) =
f
(k)
v /
√
Ek′ [‖f (k
′)
v ‖2] + , where f (k)v ∈ Hd represents the v-th element of the k-th sample in the
batch, and  denotes a small positive scalar to prevent f (k)v from being divided by zero.
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Figure 2: Architecture of the RENN (left) and alignment of architectures between neural networks
(right). The RENN is divided into three modules: the encoder module, the processing module, and the
decoder module. The encoder module extracts features from the input, and transforms it into a d-ary
feature. The input information is hidden into a random phase of the d-ary feature. The processing
module processes encrypted features without knowing the target phase. The decoder module decrypts
the input information with the target phase to get the final result.
• Avg/Max-pooling: The Avg-pooling operation satisfies Eq. (1) without any additional revisions.
Whereas, the max-pooling operation selects the element of the d-ary feature with the largest norm
value from the receptive field, which is revised into maxpool(f) = f ◦m, where f ∈ Hnd ,m ∈{0, 1}n. If the vˆ-th element in f is selected, then vˆ = arg maxv∈receptive ‖fv‖2, and mv = 1 ∈ Hd;
otherwise, mv = 0.
• Dropout: The d-ary element fv ∈ Hd in f are randomly dropped out, i.e. being set to a d-ary
number of zero with a certain dropout rate.
• Skip connection: The skip connection can be formulated as f + Φ(f) to satisfy Eq. (1).
Above operations satisfy rotation equvariance property, please see supplementary materials for proofs.
2.2 RENN
The RENN aims to achieve privacy protection. Even if given network parameters and intermediate-
layer features, attackers cannot recover the input. As Fig. 2 (left) shows, the RENN is split into three
modules: (1) The encoder module is usually embedded inside a local device at the user end, which
is used to encrypt features extracted from the input and sends them to the processing module. (2) The
processing module is deployed at the public cloud and aims to further process encrypted features.
(3) The decoder module resides at the local device of the user, whose function is to receive and
decrypt features from the processing module.
• Encoder: Given an input I ∈ I, as shown in Fig. 1, the encoder module first extracts the feature
a = g(I) ∈ Rn from the input, where g can be implemented as a multi-layer network. Then,
this input feature a together with (d − 1) fooling counterparts are converted into a d-ary feature
x ∈ Hnd . These (d − 1) fooling counterparts, b1, · · · , bd−1 ∈ Rn, are prepared by the encoder as
well. Without loss of generality, the input feature a is set as the first component of the d-ary feature,
i.e. x = [a, b1, · · · , bd−1] ∈ Hnd . The encrypted feature f is obtained by rotating x with a rotation
matrix R, i.e. f = R ◦ x, where ◦ denotes the matrix multiplication between R and each d-ary
element in x. Note that, the rotation of the d-ary feature x is analogous to rotating the d-dimensional
vector with the matrix R. Moreover, the only phase θ = R · ρ contains the input information, so θ
can be regarded as the private key, where ρ = [1, 0, 0, · · · ]T ∈ Rd is a d-dimensional vector.
• Processing module: The processing module Φ is constructed with the revised layerwise oper-
ations in Sec. 2.1, which satisfy the rotation-equivariance property. Given the encrypted features
f , the processing module outputs a d-ary feature h = Φ(f) = Φ(R ◦ x). Note that the processing
module has no access to the target phase. Even if attackers obtain intermediate-layer features, they
cannot recover the input.
• Decoder: Considering the rotation equivariance, the decoder Ψ is able to decode intermediate-
layer features h with the same rotation matrix R. Either a shallow network or a simple softmax layer
can be taken as the decoder, and the decryption result is yˆ = Ψ(Γ(R−1 ◦ h)), where Γ denotes the
operation of extracting the first component from the d-ary feature and returns a real-valued feature.
• Encoder based on GAN: To further boost the robustness to attacks, we adopt the adversarial
learning and use a GAN [5] to train the encoder. The generator of the GAN can be implemented as
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the encoder module, while the discriminator is regarded as the attacker. d-ary features produced by
the generator satisfy (1) that features contain enough information for the task; (2) that features in the
target phase and features in the other phase follow the same distribution to make the discriminator
hard to distinguish which phase contains the input information. The discriminator aims to learn to
discern the target phase which encodes input information.
Given an input I ∈ I and its real-valued feature a = g(I) ∈ Rn, we concatenate a and (d − 1)
fooling counterparts to generate the encrypted feature f = R ◦ x, x = [a, b1, · · · , bd−1] ∈ Hnd .
Theoretically, compared to d-ary features in an intermediate layer of the processing module, f is more
close to the input feature a and is the easiest to attack. Thus, we use f to train the GAN. The attacker
aims to estimate the most probable phase to decrypt f and get the input feature a. Let R′ denote
the rotation estimated by the attacker, and the feature decrypted by the attacker is a′ = Γ(R′−1 ◦ f).
Both a and a′ are inputs of the discriminator D, which needs to learn to seperate a and a′. We adopt
the WGAN [1] to train the generator and the discriminator jointly as follows.
min
g
max
D
L(g,D) = EI [D(a)− ER′ 6=R[D(a′)]] (2)
Hence, the overall loss to optimize the RENN consists of both the GAN loss and the task loss.
min
g,Φ,Ψ
max
D
Loss = min
g,Φ,Ψ
[max
D
L(g,D) + Ltask(yˆ, y)] (3)
where Ltask is the loss for the task, and y is the ground-truth label.
2.3 Previous studies as special cases of RENNs
• Specialization of RENNs: Theoretically, the complex-valued neural network(NN) [24] can be
taken as a special case of the RENN (d = 2). The complex-valued NN used a complex-valued feature
x′ = a+ bi, where b is a fooling counterpart excluding input information. The encrypted feature f ′
is obtained by rotating x′ with a random phase θ, i.e. f ′ = exp(iθ)[a+ bi].
In this study, we can also propose a quaternion NN (QNN), which uses quaternion-valued features
for privacy protection. The QNN is also a special case of the RENN (d = 3). The quaternion
q = q0 + q1i+ q2j + q3k is defined in [6], which consists of three imaginary parts q1i, q2j, q3k,
and one real part q0. A pure quaternion has a zero value of the real part, q0 = 0. The products of
basis elements i, j, k satisfy i2 = j2 = k2 = ijk = −1, and ij = k, jk = i, ki = j, ji = −k,
kj = −i, ik = −j. The QNN uses the pure quaternion-valued feature xq in the processing
module, with the input feature a and two fooling counterparts b and c, which can be written as
xq = 0+ai+bj+ck. The encryption of xq is to rotate it along a random axis o = 0+o1i+o2j+o3k
with a random rotation angle θ, where o1, o2, o3 ∈ R and ||o|| = 1. Thus, the encrypted feature
can be described as fq = Rq ◦ xq ◦Rq, where Rq = eo θ2 = cos θ2 + sin θ2 (o1i+ o2j + o3k), and
Rq = e−o
θ
2 is the conjugation of Rq . Please see supplementary materials for more details.
As discussed above, we can directly transfer parameters from a well-trained complex-valued NN to
the RENN with d = 2. More crucially, this RENN (d = 2) can also deal with d′-ary features under
specific conditions when d′ > d. It is because the d′-ary feature can be written analogous to the
d′-ary hypercomplex number as p = a + b1i1 + · · · + b(d′−1)id′−1 ∈ Hnd′ , where im denotes the
m-th imaginary part of the (d′ − 1)-ary number. In fact, the encryption in the scenario of using 2-ary
features can be considered as a special case as encryption in the scenario of d′-ary features when
we use a as the input feature and b1 as the fooling counterpart. The other (d′ − 2)-ary features in p
are set to zero, b2 = b3 = · · · = b(d′−1) = 0 ∈ Rn. Meanwhile, the rotation matrix R ∈ Rd′×d′ is
constrained as follows: R11 = cos θ,R12 = sin θ,R21 = − sin θ,R22 = cos θ; Rij = 0 if i > 2
or j > 2. In this way, the encryption based on d′-ary features is exactly equivariant to the encryptyion
of 2-ary features. Please supplementary materials for the proof.
In addition, RENNs usually have more potential phases to hide the input information than complex-
valued NNs, because complex-valued NNs only have a single fooling counterpart. Experimental
results have verified that RENNs have superior performance to complex-valued NNs.
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2.4 Attackers to RENNs
In order to test the privacy protection performance of RENNs, we use1 six different attackers designed
in [24] to attack RENNs, which belong to the following two types.
• Feature inversion attackers: Feature inversion attackers usually train another neural network to
reconstruct the input using intermediate-layer features. There exist two feature inversion attackers.
Inversion attacker 1 estimates the rotation matrix R′ encoding the input information, and uses
the feature decrypted with R′ to reconstruct the input Iˆ = dec1(Γ(R′
−1
f)). Inversion attacker 2
directly uses the encrypted features to reconstruct the input, i.e. Iˆ = dec2(f). dec1(·) and dec2(·)
denote the neural network trained for feature inversion attackers 1 and 2, respectively.
• Property inference attackers: The “property” refers to the input attribute [4], and the inference
attacker uses the intermediate-layer feature to infer sensitive attributes of inputs. In this paper, there
are four types of inference attackers. Inference attacker 1 trains the classifier to predict sensitive
attributes using real images I and ground-truth attributes attr, i.e. attr = net1(I). During the
attacking process, the attacker uses images reconstructed by the inversion attacker 1 to hack the
sensitive attribute. Inference attacker 2 decrypts the encrypted feature f with R′ obtained by the
inversion attacker 1 to get the decrypted feature a′. The classifier is trained by the attacker using
the decrypted feature a′ and ground-truth attributes attr, i.e. attr = net2(a′). During the attacking
process, the attacker uses the trained classifier and decrypted feature a′ to hack sensitive attributes.
Inference attacker 3 uses images Iˆ = dec1(a′) reconstructed by the inversion attacker 1 to train
the classifier to predict sensitive attributes attr, i.e. attr = net3(Iˆ). Inference attacker 4 applies
the k-nearest neighbors (k-NNs) instead of a neural network to infer sensitive attributes. Images,
whose decrypted features a′ are close in the feature space, are considered to share similar attributes.
3 Experiments
In this section, we conducted a series of experiments to test RENNs. Theoretically, the RENN is
capable of being applied to different tasks. Whereas, considering the limitation of paper length,
we converted a number of classical neural networks into RENNs for object classification and face
attribute estimation, considering both the feature inversion attackers and the property inference
attackers.
We trained RENNs using the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 datasets [10] with small images for object
classification. Besides, the CUB200-2011 dataset [22] and the CelebA dataset [14] were used for
object classification and face attributes estimation with large images, respectively. LeNet [12],
residual networks [8], VGG-16 [21], and AlexNet [11] were chosen to be revised into RENNs.
Network architectures: Fig. 2 (right) compares architectures between the original neural network
and its corresponding RENN. The encoder/processing/decoder modules of each original neural
network are introduced as follows. For the LeNet, the encoder consisted of all layers before the
second convolutional layer, and there was only a softmax-layer in the decoder. For the residual
network, the encoder was made up of all layers before the first 16× 16 feature map, and the decoder
contained all layers after the first 8× 8 feature map. For the AlexNet, the encoder was composed
of the first convolutional layers, and the decoder included fully-connected layers and the softmax
layer. For the VGG-16, all layers before the last 56× 56 feature map comprised the encoder, and the
decoder was composed of fully-connected layers and the softmax layer. Note that for each encoder,
we added the GAN at the end of the encoder.
Baselines: We proposed four baselines for comparison. As shown in the second row of Fig. 2 (right),
we used the original network without any revision as the first baseline, and denoted it as Original
DNN. The Original DNN was divided in the same way as RENN into encoder, processing module,
and decoder. The second baseline is shown in the third row. Considering noise addition was also
helpful for privacy protection, we added noises to the output a of the encoder, i.e. aγ, where 
denoted a random noise vector and γ was a scalar. Hence, the second baseline was described as
Noisy DNN, and trained with γ = 0.2, 0.5, 1.0. The third baseline is presented in the last row of
Fig. 2 (right), which is termed “w/ additional layers". Since the insertion of the GAN increased
the layer number of the RENN, for a fair comparison, the GAN architecture was regraded as the
1Attackers can be directly extended to RENNs without revisions.
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Table 1: Classification error rates and reconstruction errors indicating capacity of privacy protection.
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Complex
dec(x)
RENN(d = 3)
dec(a′)
RENN(d = 3)
dec(x)
RENN(d = 5)
dec(a′)
RENN(d = 5)
dec(x)
ResNet-20 CIFAR-10 11.56 9.68 10.91 9.21 - 0.0906 0.1225 0.2664 0.2420 0.3014 0.2702 - -
ResNet-32 CIFAR-10 11.13 9.67 10.48 9.82 - 0.0930 0.1171 0.2569 0.2412 0.2813 0.2412 - -
ResNet-44 CIFAR-10 10.67 9.43 11.08 9.54 - 0.0933 0.1109 0.2746 0.2419 0.3123 0.2421 - -
ResNet-56 CIFAR-10 10.17 9.16 11.53 9.24 7.73 0.0989 0.1304 0.2804 0.2377 0.3083 0.2403 0.3285 0.2542
ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 10.19 9.14 11.97 9.31 - 0.0896 0.1079 0.3081 0.2495 0.3028 0.2379 - -
R
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ct
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Model Dataset OriginalDNN
w/additional
layers
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.2
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.5
Noisy DNN
γ = 1.0
Complex
dec(a′)
Complex
dec(x)
RENN (d = 3)
dec(a′)
RENN (d = 3)
dec(x)
RENN (d = 5)
dec(a′)
RENN (d = 5)
dec(x)
LeNet CIFAR-10 0.0769 0.1208 0.0948 0.1076 0.1274 0.2405 0.2353 0.2877 0.2303 0.3021 0.2577
LeNet CIFAR-100 0.0708 0.1314 0.0950 0.1012 0.1286 0.2700 0.2483 0.2996 0.2528 - -
ResNet-56 CIFAR-100 0.0929 0.1029 0.1461 0.1691 0.2017 0.2593 0.2473 0.3057 0.2592 - -
ResNet-110 CIFAR-100 0.1050 0.1092 0.1483 0.1690 0.2116 0.2602 0.2419 0.3019 0.2543 - -
VGG-16 CUB200-2011 0.1285 0.1202 0.1764 0.0972 0.1990 0.2803 0.2100 0.3133 0.1945 - -
AlexNet CelebA 0.0687 0.1068 - - - 0.3272 0.2597 0.3239 0.2657 0.3432 0.2766
Input
Original
DNN
w\ additional 
layers
2-dimensional
dec(a’)
2-dimensional
dec(x)
3-dimensional
dec(x)
3-dimensional
dec(a’)
Figure 3: Images reconstructed from features. Left: images from the CelebA dataset; right: images
from the CIFAR-10 dataset. Please see supplementary materials for more results.
Table 2: Classification error rates on various models and
datasets.
Model, Dataset OriginalDNN
w/ additional
layers
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.2
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.5
Noisy DNN
γ = 1.0
Complex
NN
RENN
d = 3
RENN
d = 5
LeNet, CIFAR-10 19.78 21.52 24.15 27.53 34.43 17.95 11.45 11.39
LeNet, CIFAR-100 51.45 49.85 56.65 67.66 78.82 49.76 37.78 -
ResNet-56, CIFAR-100 53.26 44.38 57.24 61.31 74.17 44.37 44.86 -
ResNet-110, CIFAR-100 50.64 44.93 55.19 61.12 71.31 50.94 42.05 -
VGG-16, CUB200-2011 56.78 63.47 69.20 99.48 99.48 78.50 70.86 -
AlexNet, CelebA 14.17 9.49 - - - 15.94 8.80 9.23
Table 3: Rank of the estimated sample,
and time cost of inference.
w/ additional
layers
Complex
NN
RENN
d = 3
RENN
d = 5
Homomorphic
encryption
Rank - 9.27 241.49 46265.12 -
Time cost
(s/image) 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 0.0044 3.56
Table 4: Failure rate of identifying the reconstructed image by human annotators.
Model Dataset OriginalDNN
w/ additional
layers
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.2
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.5
Noisy DNN
γ = 1.0
Complex
dec(a′)
Complex
dec(x)
RENN (d = 3)
dec(a′)
RENN (d = 3)
dec(x)
RENN (d = 5)
dec(a′)
RENN (d = 5)
dec(x)
LeNet CIFAR-10 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.82 0.92 0.90 0.96 0.92 1.00
LeNet CIFAR-100 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.64 0.72 0.80 0.92 0.94 1.00 - -
ResNet-56 CIFAR-100 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.36 0.72 0.88 0.90 1.00 - -
ResNEt-110 CIFAR-100 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.36 0.80 0.86 0.94 0.98 - -
VGG-16 CUB200-2011 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.74 - -
AlexNet CelebA 0.04 0.24 - - - 0.96 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.94 1.00
baseline network as well. Whereas, w/ additional layers was learned without the GAN loss. [24] was
considered as the forth baseline and was simplified as Complex NN, which had the same division of
modules as the RENN.
Attackers: We applied two kinds of attackers in Sec. 2.4.
• Inversion attackers: The inversion attacker was implemented based on U-Net [19]. The
intermediate-layer feature was upsampled to the size of the input, which was fed into the inver-
sion model. There were four down-sample blocks and four up-sample blocks. Each block had six
convolutional layers for better performance, and the output of the inversion model had the same size
as the input. Intermediate-layer features from RENNs was used as the input of the attacker. In this
way, the first inversion attacker and the second inversion attacker were constructed based on the
U-Net, according to Sec. 2.4. The first inversion attacker was trained with d-ary features, and tested
with the output of D. The second inversion attack trained and tested the attacker with the encrypted
d-ary features. To mimic the procedure of hacking the privacy, we randomly sampled the rotation
matrix for 1000 times. The sample with the highest output of the discriminator was considered as the
optimal feature to reconstruct the original image.
• Inference attackers: For the inference attack, we used the CelebA and CIFAR-100 datasets for
testing. 10 attributes were selected as private attributes from the CelebA dataset. An AlexNet was
revised to a RENN, which was trained to estimate other 30 attributes. Whereas the attacker based
on ResNet-50 used the intermediate-layer feature to estimate private attributes. For the CIFAR-100
dataset, we transformed a ResNet-56 into a RENN to classify major 20 superclasses of CIFAR-100.
The attacker based on ResNet-56 used the intermediate-layer feature to infer 100 minor classes,
which were considered as sensitive information in this experiment.
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Table 5: Average error of the estimated angle.
Average Error
Model Dataset Error ofComplex NN
Error of
RENN (d = 3)
Error of
RENN (d = 5)
ResNet-20 CIFAR-10 0.7890±0.3722 1.4803±0.7004 -
ResNet-32 CIFAR-10 0.7820±0.3630 1.3322±0.6785 -
ResNet-44 CIFAR-10 0.8411±0.6200 1.4610±0.6905 -
ResNet-56 CIFAR-10 0.8088±0.5848 1.4733±0.6932 1.5802±0.4927
ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 0.8048±0.4535 1.4461±0.6955 -
LeNet CIFAR-10 0.7884±0.4147 1.3511±0.6765 1.5355±0.5043
LeNet CIFAR-100 0.8046±0.5279 1.3842±0.6694 -
ResNet-56 CIFAR-100 0.7898±0.5544 1.3837±0.7010 -
ResNet-110 CIFAR-100 0.7878±0.3775 1.3515±0.6558 -
VGG-16 CUB200 1.5572±0.8778 1.3589±0.7120 -
AlexNet CelebA 0.8500±0.5811 1.3833±0.6767 1.5571±0.4959
Table 6: Experimental results of inference attack-
ers. net(I), net(a′), net(Iˆ), k-NN represented the
first, the second, the third, and the forth inference
attacker, respectively.
Classification
Error Rate net(I) net(a
′) net(Iˆ) k-NN
Structure k = 1 k = 3 k = 5
C
IF
A
R
-
10
0 w/ additional layers 18.73 68.72 38.50 40.28 73.38 68.37 71.16Complex NN 26.77 94.53 87.17 89.56 94.44 93.63 92.50
RENN (d = 3) 21.60 96.73 94.22 95.25 98.19 97.60 97.42
RENN (d = 5) 22.33 97.92 98.14 98.22 98.67 98.56 98.48
C
el
eb
A w/ additional layers 8.04 19.14 13.17 14.01 20.14 17.26 16.20
Complex NN 14.75 25.72 22.21 22.61 31.69 27.90 26.41
RENN (d = 3) 8.20 25.03 22.19 23.26 32.77 28.81 27.42
RENN (d = 5) 7.95 25.41 25.69 25.53 32.63 28.95 27.55
Figure 4: CelebA images reconstructed using different phases. The first image in each group is
the input image. We show the most meaningful images. More results are shown in supplementary
materials.
Evaluation metrics of privacy protection: We used four metrics to evaluate the performance of
privacy protection in terms of inversion attackers: (1) the pixel-level reconstruction error E[‖Iˆ − I‖],
where the pixel value was scaled to [0, 1]. (2) The average difference angle ∆θ between the decrypted
input information a and the decrypted feature a′ by the attacker, i.e. ∆θ = arccos〈R · ρ,R′ · ρ〉,
where ρ = [1, 0, 0, · · · ]T ∈ Rd (3) The rank of the estimated sample. Let us recover two samples
using two similar phases. According to our experience, when the angle between phases was less
than pi/36, two samples usually presented the same object entity. Thus, we estimated the number of
object entities that were more similar to the input than the recovered sample. For the 5-ary RENN,
3-ary RENN and Complex NN, ranks of the estimated sample are computed as 42−3 cos ∆θ+cos3 ∆θ ,
2
1−cos ∆θ and
2pi
∆θ , respectively. Please see supplementary materials for derivations of above formulas.
(4) The reconstruction failure rate of human identification, i.e. we used human annotators to judge
whether they can identify the input based on the reconstructed sample Iˆ . For the privacy performance
of inference attacks, the accuracy of attackers can be regarded as the evaluation metric. Moreover,
the processing speed of different models can be computed to measure the efficiency of RENNs.
Experimental Results and Analysis: Table 1 and Table 2 show the performance of RENNs and
baselines. Complex dec(a′) and Complex dec(x) represented the inversion attacker 1 and the
inversion attacker 2 on Complex NN, respectively. “RENN (d = 3) dec(a′),” “RENN (d = 3)
dec(x),” “RENN (d = 5) dec(a′),” “RENN (d = 5) dec(x)” represented the inversion attacker 1
based on dec(a′) and the inversion attacker 2 based on dec(x) on the 3-ary RENN and the 5-ary
RENN, respectively. Classification error rate results showed that RENNs with d = 3 and RENNs
with d = 5 achieved better performances than Complex NNs. Compared with Original DNN
and DNNs with additional layers, the accuracy of RENNs (d = 3) and RENNs (d = 5) was not
significantly affected. As for the reconstruction error, a higher value indicated a better privacy
protection performance. Reconstruction errors of 5-ary RENNs were higher than other networks, i.e.
5-ary RENNs exhibited better performance of privacy protection than other networks.
Fig. 3 visualizes several examples from inversion attackers. We only provided results from partial
experiments constrained by the space. Please see supplementary materials for more results. Table 5
shows averages and standard errors of ∆θ. A smaller value of the average ∆θ indicated that attackers
were easier to estimate the target phase. Table 4 shows the subjective failure rate according to the
judgement of humans. Attackers could not fetch the input information from encrypted features. It was
more difficult to estimate the target phase of 3-ary and 5-ary features than complex-valued features.
Fig. 4 shows images reconstructed using different phases, and Table 3 shows the rank of the estimated
sample. A higher rank value indicated better performance of privacy protection. The ranks of the
3-ary RENN and the 5-ary RENN were higher than the Complex NN. I.e. it was more difficult for
attackers on RENNs to find the target phase than attackers on Complex NNs.
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Table 3 also shows the time cost of the inference process of DNNs. The time cost of homomorphic
encryption was from the framework Gazelle [9], which trained a small network with 3 fully-connected
layers from [17] using the CIFAR-10 dataset. For other networks, we used networks revised from the
ResNet-56, which were deeper than the network used by Gazelle. However, the inference time cost
of the 3-ary RENN was much less than Gazelle, and was comparable with traditional DNNs.
Table 6 shows the result of inference attackers. A higher value of inference error indicated a better
privacy protection performance. Attackers on 5-ary RENNs had a higher inference classification error
than attackers on DNNs with additional layers, and attackers on Complex NN. Thus, 5-ary RENNs
protected private attributes from attackers more effectively.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a method to protect the privacy of inputs. Our method transforms traditional
DNNs into RENNs, which use d-ary features as intermediate-layer features. The input information
is hidden in a random phase of d-ary features. Experiments showed the effectiveness of the privacy
protection of RENNs, which have much lower computational cost than the homomorphic encryption.
Broader Impact
This study has broad impacts on privacy protection in DNNs. Our research provides researchers with
a set of generic rules to revise various traditional DNNs into rotation-equivariant neural networks
for privacy protection. Compared to homomorphic encryption, our RENN requires significantly less
computational cost. Crucially, the complex-valued NN can be considered as a specific case of a
RENN. The superior performance and the generality of the theory ensure that the RENN has broad
impacts on both theory and practice.
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A Rotation Equivariance
A.1 Applying the convolution operation to a d-ary feature is equivalent to applying the same
convolution operation to each component in the d-ary feature
In the Sec. 2.1 of the paper, we briefly introduce the revision of the convolution operation. In this
section, we aim to show that applying the convolution operation to a d-ary feature is equivalent to
applying the same convolution operation to each component in the d-ary feature.
Given a d-ary feature f = [a, b1, b2, · · · , bd−1] ∈ Hnd and a real-valued vector w ∈ Rn, as discussed
in the paper, the d-ary feature f can also be represented as a n× d matrix.
f =

a1 b1,1 b2,1 · · · bd−1,1
a2 b1,2 b2,2 · · · bd−1,2
...
...
...
. . .
...
an b1,n b2,n · · · bd−1,n
 . (4)
Then, we have
wTf = [w1, w2, · · · , wn]×

a1 b1,1 b2,1 · · · bd−1,1
a2 b1,2 b2,2 · · · bd−1,2
...
...
...
. . .
...
an b1,n b2,n · · · bd−1,n

=
[
n∑
i=1
aiwi,
n∑
i=1
b1,iwi, · · · ,
n∑
i=1
bd−1,iwi
]
=
[
wTa,wTb1, w
Tb2, · · · , wTbd−1
]
(5)
Thus, applying a convolution operation to the d-ary feature is equivalent to applying the convolution
operation to each component of the d-ary feature.
A.2 Signal processing of a d-ary feature is equivalent to applying the same signal processing
to each component in the d-ary feature
Assuming that f = x ·R, the output of the processing module Φ(·) using ReLU as non-linear layers
can be written as
Φ(f) = ΦL(ΦL−1(· · ·Φ1(x ·R)))
= σ(W TLσ(W
T
L−1(· · ·σ(W T1 x ·R))))
(6)
where σ(·) represent the function of ReLU. The ReLU function can be considered as the element-wise
multiplication. For the first ReLU layer in the processing module, we can represent the ReLU function
as σ(W T1 f) = Σ1W
T
1 f , where Σ1 = diag(c1; c2; c3; · · · ; cn). ci ∈ {0, 1} denotes the binary gating
state for the i-th element in W T1 f , and n is the number of elements in W
T
1 f . In this way, a real valued
matrix A = ΣLW TLΣL−1W
T
L−1 · · ·Σ1W T1 denotes the effect that combines all transformations in
Φ(f).
Thus, we can rewrite the above equation as follows
Φ(f) = σ(W TLσ(W
T
L−1(· · ·σ(W T1 f))))
= ΣLW
T
LΣL−1W
T
L−1 · · ·Σ1W T1 f
= Af
(7)
According to Eqn. (5) and Eqn. (7), we have
Φ(f) = Af
= [Af1, Af2, · · · , Afd]
= [Φ(f1),Φ(f2), · · · ,Φ(fd)].
(8)
where f i denotes the i-th component of the d-ary feature f . Therefore, the signal processing of f by
the processing module is equivalent to applying the same signal processing to each component of f .
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A.3 Proof of Φ(f ·R) = Φ(f) ·R
In this paper, we revise the operation of each layer in the processing module to ensure that the
input information is always encoded in the same phase of all d-ary features. Recursively, layerwise
operations in processing module are supposed to satisfy
Φ(f ·R) = Φ(f) ·R
Where Φ(·) is a certain layerwise operation and f ∈ Hnd is a real-valued intermediate-layer feature
Let us consider the following six most common types of layers/operations that are revised to construct
the processing module, i.e. convolutional layer, ReLU, batch-normalization, Avg/Max-pooling,
drop-out and skip-connection in Sec. 2.1 of the paper.
A.3.1 Convolutional layer (or fully-connected layer)
For revised convolutional layer, we remove bias term. Thus, we get
Conv(f) = w · f
=
w11 · · · w1n... . . . ...
wD1 · · · wDn
 ·
f1...
fn

=
 (w11f1 + · · ·+ w1nfn)...
(wD1f1 + · · ·+ wDnfn)

where fv ∈ Hd denotes the v-th (1 ≤ v ≤ n) d-ary element in the feature f = [f1, · · · ,fn]T ∈ Hnd .
Here, we represent f as a n× d matrix. Thus we get
Conv(f ·R) = w · (f ·R)
=
w11 · · · w1n... . . . ...
wD1 · · · wDn
 · (
f1...
fn
 ·R)
=
 (w11(f1R) + · · ·+ w1n(fnR))...
(wD1(f1R) + · · ·+ wDn(fnR))

=
 ((w11f1R) + · · ·+ (w1nfnR))...
((wD1f1R) + · · ·+ (wDnfnR))

= (wf) ·R = Conv(f) ·R
A.3.2 ReLU
Because R is a rotation matrix, we get
‖ fv ·R ‖=‖ fv ‖ .
Thus the revised ReLU operation ReLU(fv) =
‖fv‖
max{‖fv‖,C} · fv is rotation-equivariant. The proof is
given below.
ReLU(fv ·R) = ‖ fv ·R ‖max{‖ fv ·R ‖, C} · fv ·R
=
‖ fv ‖
max{‖ fv ‖, C} · fv ·R
= fv · ‖ fv ‖max{‖ fv ‖, C} ·R
= ReLU(fv) ·R
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A.3.3 Batch-normalization
The revised Batch-normalization norm(f (k)v ) =
f
(k)
v√
Ek′ [‖ f (k
′)
v ‖2] + 
is rotation-equivariant. The
proof is given below.
norm(f (k)v ·R) =
f
(k)
v ·R√
Ek′ [‖ f (k
′)
v ·R ‖2] + 
=
f
(k)
v ·R√
Ek′ [‖ f (k
′)
v ‖2] + 
=
f
(k)
v√
Ek′ [‖ f (k
′)
v ‖2] + 
·R
= norm(f (k)v ) ·R
, where f (k)v denotes the feature of the k-th sample.
A.3.4 Avg/Max-pooling/Dropout
The Avg/Max-pooling operation and dropout layer can be represented as pool/dropout(f) = f ◦m,
where f ∈ Hnd , and m ∈ {0, 1}n represents the selection of elements. Hence
pool/dropout(f ·R) = (f ·R) ◦m = (f ◦m) ·R
= pool/dropout(f) ·R
A.3.5 Skip connection
Skip connection can be formulated as f + Φ(f). If Φ(f) is rotation-equivariant then
f ·R+ Φ(f ·R) = f ·R+ Φ(f) ·R
= (f + Φ(f)) ·R
B Experiments: visualization
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 in the supplementary material show more visualization results of the Fig. 3 in the
paper on CIFAR-10 and CelebA, respectively.
Fig. 7 in the supplementary material shows more reconstructed results of the Fig. 4 in the paper when
the inversion attacker uses different phases to decrypt the 3-ary feature. The first image of every two
rows is the original input image. Our method performed the best in the privacy protection.
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Figure 5: CIFAR-10 images reconstructed from different neural networks.
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Figure 6: CelebA images reconstructed from different neural networks.
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Figure 7: CelebA images reconstructed from different phases. The first image of every two rows is
the original input image.
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(a) Rank of the estimated 
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Figure 8: Rank of the estimated sample in (a) the Complex NN, and (b) the 3-ary RENN. The target
phase is the phase that contains the input information. ∆θ is the angle between the target phase and
the estimated phase used by attackers. (a) C1 represents the circular arc, which is determined by
∆θ. C1 = r ·∆θ contains all phases better than the estimated phase. C2 = r · pi36 represents a small
circular arc determined by pi36 , phases in which can be considered to represent the same result as the
target phase. The ratio C1/C2 between the length of C1 and the length of C2 reflects the rank of the
estimated phase in the Complex NN. (b) C1 = r ·∆θ represents the spherical crown that contains all
phases better than the estimated phase. C2 = r · pi36 represents a small spherical crown, phases in
which can be considered to represent the same result. The ratio C1/C2 between the area of C1 and
the area of C2 reflects the rank of the estimated phase.
C Computation of the rank of the estimated sample.
The result of the rank of the estimated samples was shown in Table 3 of the paper. In this section, we
introduce the computation of the rank of the estimated samples in different RENNs.
The rank of the estimated sample reflects the number of samples that are more similar to the input
than the estimated sample. The estimated sample is generated by inversion attackers, who aim to use
different phases to decrypt the encrypted d-ary feature to get the input information. ∆θ denotes the
angle between the phase estimated by attackers and the phase that contains the input information. If
the angle between the phase of another sample and the phase contains the input information is less
than ∆θ, then we consider this sample to be more similar to the input than the estimated sample.
We propose the following method to compute the rank of the estimated sample. For the d-ary feature,
we can use a point in d-dimensional space to represent a phase. As Fig. 8 shows, all possible phases
of the d-ary feature form a d-dimensional sphere with a radius r. Note that the radius r will be
eliminated to compute the rank, so we do not need to consider the value of r. In this way, all samples
that are more similar to the estimated sample form a spherical crown, whose area is denoted by C1.
Area(C1) represents the area of the spherical crown C1. According to our experience, if the angle
between two phases was less than pi/36, then the corresponding two samples usually represent the
same inversion result. Samples that represent the same inversion result can form another spherical
crown, whose area is given as C2. In this way, the number of samples that are more similar to the
input than the estimated sample is positively related to the number of C2 contained by C1. I.e. the
rank of the estimated sample can be computed as C1/C2. Therefore, the rank of the estimated feature
in the 3-ary RENN can be computed as follows.
Rank3-ary RENN =
C1
C2
=
∫∆θ
0
(2pir sin θ)r dθ∫ pi
36
0
(2pir sin θ)r dθ
=
2pir2(1− cos∆θ)
2pir2(1− cos pi36 )
=
1− cos∆θ
1− cos( pi36 )
As for the 5-ary RENN, computing the area of a 5-dimensional spherical crown needs the area of a
4-dimensional sphere, which is 2pi2r3. r is the radius of the sphere. Thus, the rank of the estimated
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feature in the 5-ary RENN can be computed as follows.
Rank5-ary RENN =
C1
C2
=
∫∆θ
0
2pi2(r sin θ)3r dθ∫ pi
36
0
2pi2(r sin θ)3r dθ
=
( 23 − cos ∆θ + 13 cos3 ∆θ)pi2r4
( 23 − cos pi36 + 13 cos3 pi36 )pi2r4
=
2− 3 cos ∆θ + cos3 ∆θ
2− 3 cos pi36 + cos3 pi36
Similarly, for the Complex NN, we can consider it as the 2-ary RENN. As Fig.8 (a) shows, the sphere
in the 2-dimensional space is a circle, and the spherical crown in the 2-dimensional space is a circular
arc. The area of the spherical crown can be computed as the length of the circular arc. Thus, the rank
can be computed as follows.
RankComplex =
C1
C2
=
2∆θr
2× pi36r
=
36∆θ
pi
We compute the rank for each estimated sample, and report the average rank over all samples in Table
3 of the paper.
D Special cases of RENNs
D.1 Complex-valued neural networks (Complex-valued NNs)
Let (I, y) ∈ D denote an input and its label in the training dataset, and let g be the encoder at the
local device. Given the input I , the intermediate-layer feature is computed as
a = g(I) ∈ Rn, (9)
but we do not directly submit a to the processing module. Instead, we introduce a fooling counterpart
b to construct a complex-valued feature as follows:
x = exp(iθ)
[
a+ bi
]
, (10)
where θ and b ∈ Rn are randomly chosen. b is the fooling counterpart, which does not contain
any private information of a, but its magnitude is comparable with a to cause obfuscation. The
encoded feature is then sent to the processing module Φ, which produces the complex-valued feature
h = Φ(x). Upon receiving h, the decoder makes prediction yˆ on I by inverting the complex-valued
feature h back:
yˆ = d(<[h · exp(−iθ)]), (11)
where d denotes the decoder module, which can be constructed as either a shallow network or just a
softmax layer. <(·) denotes the operation of picking real parts of complex values.
The core design of the processing module is to allow the complex-valued feature h = Φ(x) to
be successfully decoded later by the decoder. I.e. if we rotate the complex-valued feature a + bi
by an angle θ, all the features of the following layers are supposed to be rotated by the same
angle. We represent the processing module as the cascaded functions of multiple layers Φ(x) =
Φn(Φn−1(· · ·Φ1(x))), where Φj(·) denotes the function of the j-th layer; fj = Φj(fj−1) represents
the output of the j-th layer. Thus the processing module should have the following property:
Φ(f (θ)) = eiθΦ(f) s.t. f (θ) , eiθf, ∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi). (12)
In other words, the function of each intermediate layer in the processing module should satisfy
Φj(f
(θ)
j−1) = e
iθΦj(fj−1) s.t. f
(θ)
j−1 , eiθfj−1, ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, ∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi). (13)
to recursively prove Eqn. (12).
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D.2 Quaternion-valued neural networks (QNNs)
Quaternion: Quaternion is a number system extended from the complex number. Unlike the complex
number, a quaternion consists of three imaginary parts q1i, q2j, q3k, and one real part q0, which is
given as q = q0 + q1i+ q2j + q3k. If the real part of a quaternion is zero (q0 = 0), we call it a pure
quaternion. The quaternion subject to ||q|| =
√
q20 + q
2
1 + q
2
2 + q
2
3 = 1 is termed a unit quaternion.
The products of basis elements i, j, k are given as i2 = j2 = k2 = ijk = −1, and ij = k, jk = i,
ki = j, ji = −k, kj = −i, ik = −j. Note that the multiplication of two imaginary parts is
non-commutative, i.e. ij 6= ji, jk 6= kj, ki 6= ik. Each quaternion has a polar decomposition. The
polar decomposition of a unit quaternion is defined as eo
θ
2 = cos θ2 + sin
θ
2 (o1i + o2j + o3k), s.t.√
o21 + o
2
2 + o
2
3 = 1.
When we use a pure quaternion q = 0 + q1i+ q2j + q3k to represent a point [q1, q2, q3]T ∈ R3 in a
3D space, the rotation of the point around the axis o = o1i+ o2j + o3k, s.t.
√
o21 + o
2
2 + o
2
3 = 1,
by the angle θ can be represented as RqR, where R = eo
θ
2 , and R = e−o
θ
2 is the conjugation of R.
Given a pure quaternion-valued vector x = 0+ai+ bj+ ck ∈ Hn, and a real-valued vector w ∈ Rn,
we have
xTw =
n∑
v=1
xvwv = 0 + (a
Tw)i+ (bTw)j + (cTw)k (14)
Design of the QNN: We introduce a set of basic rules to transform a traditional neural network
into a QNN. We only revise the traditional real-valued feature to the quaternion-valued feature.
In comparison, parameters in the QNN, e.g. weights in a filter, are still real numbers, instead of
quaternions.
Encoder: Given an input I ∈ I, the encoder module g computes a traditional real-valued feature a, as
follows.
a = g(I) ∈ Rn (15)
Then the encoder module uses a and two fooling counterparts b, c to generate a quaternion-valued
feature x = 0+ai+bj+ck ∈ Hn. Each element in x is a quaternion. Note that we can equivalently
let b = g(I) or c = g(I) without loss of generality. We encrypt the quaternion-valued feature by
rotating x along a random axis o = 0+o1i+o2j+o3k by a random rotation angle θ, o1, o2, o3 ∈ R,||o|| = 1, and obtain the encrypted feature f ∈ Hn, as follows.
f = ΨR(a) = R ◦ x ◦R = R ◦ (0 + ai+ bj + ck) ◦R (16)
where ΨR(·) denotes the function which applies a random rotation R to the original quaternion-
valued feature x, R = eo
θ
2 = cos θ2 + sin
θ
2 (o1i + o2j + o3k), and ◦ denotes the element-wise
multipication. The encrypted feature f will be sent to the processing module Φ. In this way, we can
consider RiR as the target phase, which encodes the input information, and R can be taken as the
private key.
Processing module: Inspired by homomorphic encryption, we revise the operation of each layer in
the processing module to satisfy rotation equivariance of the quaternion-valued feature. The rotation
equivariance property ensures that the input information is always encoded in the same phase of all
quaternion-valued features of all layers in the processing module. In this way, the decoder module
can use the target phase to decrypt the input information from the quaternion-valued feature.
The rotation equivariance property can be summarized, as follows. If we use R ◦ x ◦R to rotate
quaternion-valued feature x along the axis o by the angle θ, then quaternion-valued feature elements
in each intermediate layer of the processing module are supposed to be rotated along the same axis
by the same angle, as follows.
Φ(R ◦ x ◦R) = R ◦Φ(x) ◦R (17)
Let us consider h0 = Φ(x) without the rotation as the output of the processing module, i.e. θ = 0,
R = eo
θ
2 = 1. The input information is hidden in the imaginary part i. Since all parameters in the
processing module are real-valued, according to Eqn. (14), the output of the processing module can
be represented in the form
h0 = Φ(x) = 0 + (Aa)i+ (Ab)j + (Ac)k. (18)
A is a real-valued matrix that represents effects that combine all non-linear transformations in Φ(x),
when Φ(x) only uses ReLU as non-linear layers. Please see the supplementary material for the
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computation of A. In this way, the input information is still hidden in the imaginary part i of h0.
Then, let us consider the rotation R, h = Φ(R ◦ x ◦R). According to Eqn. (17) and Eqn. (18), the
output is given as
h = Φ(R ◦ x ◦R) = R ◦ h0 ◦R
= (RiR) ◦ (Aa) + (RjR) ◦ (Ab) + (RkR) ◦ (Ac)
(19)
In this way, the input information is hidden in the phase RiR of h. To ensure the above rotation
equivariance, we recursively ensure rotation equivariance of the layerwise operation of each layer
inside the processing module. The processing module can be represented as cascaded layers Φ(f) =
ΦL(ΦL−1(· · ·Φ1(f)), where Φl(·) denotes the l-th layer in the processing model. Let f ′ denote the
input feature of the l-th layer, then the layerwise operation is supposed to satisfy
Φl(R ◦ f ′ ◦R) = R ◦ Φl(f ′) ◦R. (20)
Thus, this equation recursively ensures rotation equivariance in Eqn. (17).
Decoder: Let h = Φ(f). Let d denote the decoder module, which can be implemented as a shallow
network or a simple softmax layer. The decoder module can get the final result yˆ as follows.
yˆ = d(Ψ−1R (h)), Ψ
−1
R (h) = Imi(R ◦ h ◦R) (21)
where Ψ−1R (·) indicates the inverse function of ΨR(·). The rotation in Eqn. (21) is the inverse of the
rotation in Eqn. (16). Imi(·) denotes the operation that picks the i part from quaternions, and returns
a real-valued feature.
D.3 Complex-valued NN and QNN are special cases of RENNs
For the complex-valued NN: We can rewrite the complex-valued feature a + bi as a 2-ary feature
f ∈ Hn2 , in which a, b ∈ Rn are taken as the two components. Accordingly, the rotation of the
complex-valued feature a + bi by exp[θi] can be represented in the scenario of 2-ary features as
follows.
exp[θi] · [a+ bi] corresponds to R ◦ f , where R = [ cos(θ) − sin(θ)
cos(θ) sin(θ)
]
. (22)
It is because
exp[θi] · [a+ bi] = [a · cos(θ)− b · sin(θ)] + i[a · sin(θ) + b · cos(θ)] (23)
For the QNN: We can rewrite the quaternion-valued feature ai+ bj + ck as a 3-ary feature f ∈ Hn3 ,
in which a, b, c ∈ Rn are taken as the three components. Accordingly, the rotation of the quaternion-
valued feature ai + bj + ck by eo
θ
2 = cos θ2 + sin
θ
2 (o1i + o2j + o3k) can be represented in the
scenario of 3-ary features as follows.
exp[o
θ
2
] ◦ [ai+ bj + ck] ◦ exp[−oθ
2
] corresponds to R ◦ f , (24)
where,
R=
 − sin2( θ2 )[o22 + o23] − cos( θ2 ) sin( θ2 )o3 + sin2( θ2 )o1o2 cos( θ2 ) sin( θ2 )o2 + sin2( θ2 )o1o3cos( θ
2
) sin( θ
2
)o3 + sin
2( θ
2
)o1o2 − sin2( θ2 )[o21 + o23] − cos( θ2 ) sin( θ2 )o1 + sin2( θ2 )o2o3
− cos( θ
2
) sin( θ
2
)o2 + sin
2( θ
2
)o1o3 cos(
θ
2
) sin( θ
2
)o1 + sin
2( θ
2
)o2o3 − sin2( θ2 )[o21 + o22]
 .
(25)
D.4 Transferring parameters from the complex-valued NN to RENNs (d ≥ 2)
• In previous subsections, we have proved that the complex-valued NN and the QNN can be
represented as special cases of RENNs when d = 2 and d = 3, respectively. Therefore, it is easy
to know that we can directly transfer parameters in a well-trained complex-valued NN into a
RENN with d = 2.
• Instead of showing how to define the rotation matrix R to enable a RENN with d > 2 to use
parameters of a complex-valued NN (a RENN with d = 2), in this subsection, let us focus on a
more generic problem, i.e. how to define the rotation matrix R to enable a d-ary RENN to use
parameters of a d′-ary RENN when d > d′.
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Let us consider the inference process of the d′-ary RENN. Let f ′ = R′ ◦ x′ ∈ Hnd′ denote the
encrypted feature of the d′-ary RENN, where R′ ∈ Rd′×d′ is referred to as the rotation matrix. Let
f ′v denote a specific element in the d
′-ary feature f , which can also be represented as a d′-dimensional
vector. Thus, we can use the matrix F ′ ∈ Rd′×n to represent the d′-ary feature f ′. Accordingly,
the matrix X ′ ∈ Rd′×n corresponds to the d′-ary feature x′. In this way, the convolution operation
(without the bias term) of f ′ can be written as Φ(F ′) = F ′ ·W ∈ Rd′×m, where W ′ ∈ Rn×m. I.e.
we get
F ′d′×n = R
′
d′×d′Xd′×n, Φ(F
′)d′×m = F ′d′×nWn×m. (26)
Then, let us consider how to run a d-ary RENN with parameters in the d′-ary RENN (d > d′). In this
case, the input feature x contains d− d′ additional components. We set these d− d′ components as
0, and set the rotation matrix R, as follows.
R =
[
R′d′×d′ 0d×(d−d′)
0(d−d′)×d 0(d−d′)×(d−d′)
]
d×d
, X =
[
X ′d′×n
0(d−d′)×n
]
d×n
(27)
In this case, we have
F = RX =
[
R′d′×d′ 0d×(d−d′)
0(d−d′)×d 0(d−d′)×(d−d′)
]
d×d
·
[
X ′d′×n
0(d−d′)×n
]
d×n
=
[
R′d′×d′X
′
d′×n
0(d−d′)×n
]
d×n
=
[
F ′d′×n
0(d−d′)×n
]
d×n
Φ(F ) = Fd×nWn×m =
[
F ′d′×n
0(d−d′)×n
]
Wn×m =
[
F ′d′×nWn×m
0(d−d′)×n
]
=
[
Φ(F ′)d′×n
0(d−d′)×n
]
d×n
.
(28)
Thus, given the specific rotation matrix R, the signal processing in the d-ary RENN is the same as
that in the d′-ary RENN, which proves that we can use the d-ary RENN make inference.
D.5 The value of d vs. the capacity of privacy protection
When we use a RENN with more components (i.e. setting a large value of d), the RENN contains more
fooling counterparts, which leads to a higher capacity of privacy protection. However, meanwhile,
the more components also boost the difficulty of learning a RENN, because in this case, network
parameters need to simultaneously deal with more noisy data.
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